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Building a more stable financial system : 
regulatory reform in a post-crisis perspective
peter	praet
finally had to intervene with public money on an enor-
mous  scale  to  rescue  large  financial  institutions  and, 
indeed, avoid a meltdown of the entire financial system. 
These events have resulted in a sea change in the mindset, 
views, and focus of financial authorities, leading to what 
may be described as a new regulatory and supervisory 
culture. As a result, a number of regulatory reforms have 
been  proposed  or  are  being  formulated  and,  if  imple-
mented,  are  likely  to  have  far-reaching  consequences 
for the financial sector. The reforms touch on all of the 
key areas relating to the maintenance of financial stabil-
ity  −  supervision,  regulation,  and  crisis  management  − 
reflecting a holistic response to the weaknesses exposed 
by the crisis. It is necessary to take a broad approach, 
which addresses not only the issue of inadequate capital 
and liquidity buffers of financial institutions going into the 
crisis but also the failure of authorities to detect exces-
sive risk taking, difficulties encountered in dealing with 
distressed banks once the crisis erupted, and the need to 
reduce moral hazard created by the perception that sys-
temically important institutions will be bailed out.
This article focuses on proposed reforms in the areas of 
banking regulation and crisis management. In particular, 
it discusses how the crisis has transformed some of the 
views  and  approaches  of  financial  authorities,  and  the 
relation between the evolving, post-crisis consensus and 
proposed  reforms  of  the  Basel  II  framework  that  have 
been put forward by the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision. In addition, while these proposed changes 
to banking regulation aim to strengthen the resilience of 
financial institutions and to avoid a future crisis, efforts 
are also needed to improve authorities' ability to effec-
tively deal with distressed financial institutions or resolve 
Introduction
Much has been written about the causes of the recent 
financial  crisis,  which  was  triggered  in  2007  by  wide-
spread  losses  on  securitisation  transactions  involving 
U.S. subprime mortgages, and reached an acute phase 
with the failure of Lehman Brothers in September, 2008.   
Several factors have been identified as playing a major 
role in the massive build-up of risk in the years preced-
ing the crisis and the consequent losses once the crisis 
erupted. Interest rates, which were held at a low level over 
a long period, combined with macroeconomic imbalances 
to give rise to a widespread “search for yield” by inves-
tors. Complex financial products, whose risk was not well 
understood by either rating agencies or investors, helped 
to  satisfy  this  demand  for  yield.  Banks  took  on  high 
degrees of leverage – all the while reporting strong regu-
latory capital ratios based on risk-weighted assets – by 
increasing funding with significant maturity mismatches 
and by creating off-balance-sheet vehicles requiring only 
minimal or no regulatory capital charges. Finally, weak risk 
management and governance systems in financial institu-
tions meant that managers did not always understand the 
risks their institutions were taking, nor that many of these 
risks were excessive. 
All of these factors resulted in a crisis that was truly sys-
temic and global.  Markets for virtually all assets dropped 
sharply. Sudden dry-ups of market liquidity paralysed mar-
kets such as those for asset-backed commercial paper or 
short-term interbank loans that had previously been con-
sidered safe. Banks around the world were forced to take 
colossal losses on traded assets, and they faced funding 
difficulties  that  threatened  their  survival.  Central  banks 
poured liquidity into the markets, and many governments 116
a crisis when it occurs. A number of critical reforms to 
crisis  management  and  resolution  frameworks  are  thus 
discussed in this context. Section 1 describes the pre- to 
post-crisis  evolution  of  regulatory  views.  Section  2  dis-
cusses banking reforms that have been proposed in light 
of this evolution. Section 3 then turns to reforms of crisis 
resolution frameworks. Section 4 concludes. 
1.  Evolving regulatory paradigms and 
practices
This section characterises the pre-crisis to post-crisis evolu-
tion of views along several important dimensions, includ-
ing  the  focus  of  regulation,  the  regulatory  framework, 
and underlying assumptions about markets.  
1.1  Regulatory focus 
Perhaps the most striking outgrowth of the crisis is a change 
in the focus of banking regulation, from a narrow concern 
with  the  resiliency  of  individual  institutions  (the  “micro-
prudential” approach) to a broader preoccupation with the 
entire financial system (the “macro-prudential” approach). 
The crisis has vividly illustrated that the distress or failure of 
certain  “systemically  important”  financial  institutions  can 
generate risk in the entire, global financial system.  (1)
In addition, the potential impact that failed institutions 
can have on the financial system appears to have intensi-
fied over time, partly as a result of heightened intercon-
nectedness between institutions which has taken increas-
ingly diverse, complex, and opaque forms. In the run-up 
to  the  crisis,  significant  exposures  between  financial 
institutions  occurred  not  just  through  traditional  inter-
bank markets but also through other types of exposures 
such  as  derivatives  (e.g.,  credit  default  swaps),  which 
were typically traded over the counter and could often 
be  quite  complex.  Proposed  regulatory  reforms  aiming 
to  mitigate  problems  with  interconnectedness  and  the 
potential  impact  of  systemically  important  institutions 
include increased capital requirements for exposures by 
banks to large financial institutions, increased capital for 
counterparty credit risk, and consideration of special poli-
cies such as capital or liquidity surcharges for systemically 
important financial institutions.
Systemic risk, however, does not arise solely as a result 
of the failure of systemically important institutions. Other 
sources  of  systemic  risk  include  common  exposures  by 
many  institutions  to  similar  assets  or  risks,  externalities 
linked to “herd” behaviour of market participants, or sec-
ond-round, feedback effects due to shocks. For example, 
asset price declines that may result from de-leveraging by 
one or more large financial institutions following a shock 
may increase losses and further exacerbate the distress at 
the initial institutions or generate distress at other institu-
tions, leading to a vicious spiral of asset price declines 
and de-leveraging activity. One of the challenges of mac-
roprudential supervision will be the early identification of 
potential risks to the system along these lines. 
Finally, the level of risk in the financial system varies over 
time. Indeed, it has long been observed that the behaviour 
of financial institutions tends to fluctuate with the busi-
ness cycle. For example, during favourable periods col-
lateral values increase, risk appetites increase, and banks 
relax their lending standards. In downturns banks experi-
ence  loan  losses,  face  increased  capital  requirements, 
and they contract their lending. These cyclical patterns in 
lending can accentuate the business cycle (a phenomenon 
known as procyclicality), resulting in an excessive build-up 
of risk in booms and an associated realisation of large 
losses  in  recessions.  Many  observers  have  argued  that 
developments in the financial system prior to the crisis 
heightened procyclicality, and consequently, the severity 
of the crisis. Current regulatory reforms aimed at mitigat-
ing procyclicality include a proposal to create a cyclical 
capital “buffer”, or amount of capital above the regula-
tory minimum. Financial institutions would be required to 
build up the buffer in good times, and they could then 
draw on the buffer to cover losses in unfavourable times. 
1.2  Regulatory framework 
The decade preceding the crisis saw the development of 
regulatory standards based on industry best practices. This 
best-practice  approach  to  regulation  involved  continual 
contact between regulatory bodies and representatives of 
the financial industry, with the aim of improving regula-
tion by adapting it to changes in banking and risk man-
agement practices, while maintaining an internationally 
level playing field. (See BCBS, 2006). A prime example of 
this approach is given by the use in the Basel II framework 
of risk assessments generated by banks’ internal systems, 
as inputs to the calculation of risk-weighted assets, which 
are then used to determine minimum regulatory capital 
requirements.
Another  reflection  of  the  best-practice  approach  to 
regulation is the use of a value-at-risk (VaR) framework 
for establishing minimum capital requirements. The mini-
mum requirements were calibrated so that capital would 
(1)  See Castro and Ferrari (this FSR) for a discussion of issues relating to systemic risk 
and the systemic importance of institutions.117
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be sufficient to cover losses up to a particular percentile 
(99.9 p.c. for loan portfolios) of the loss distribution for 
a typical bank.  (1) In theory, this would suggest that banks 
hold enough capital to cover losses in all events except 
those  which  could  be  expected  to  occur  once  in  one 
thousand years.  
Yet,  in  order  for  a  regulatory  approach  based  on  best 
practices to succeed, market best practices must be both 
sound and robust. As the crisis has illustrated, however, 
VaR methodologies suffer from a number of shortcom-
ings. In particular, VaR estimates are subject to significant 
model risk, embodied either in assumptions such as those 
relating  to  default  probabilities  or  default  correlations 
among the loans in a portfolio, or in the reliance on his-
torical data – often quite recent – for estimating the loss 
distribution  for  traded  assets.  Changes  in  the  underly-
ing assumptions or data can in fact produce significant 
changes  in  the  estimated  distribution  of  losses  and, 
hence, in the necessary amount of capital. 
The  post-crisis  recognition  of  the  importance  of  model 
risk  has  resulted  in  calls  for  greater  amounts  of  capital 
than those implied by VaR analyses, in order to ensure 
that capital does indeed serve as an effective cushion in 
absorbing losses of the institution as a going concern. In 
addition, there is a perceived need to strengthen the loss-
absorption capacity of the instruments that are included in 
the regulatory definition of capital.  A number of proposed 
regulatory reforms thus appear to be aimed at addressing 
these issues : an increase in the quality of regulatory capi-
tal ; expansion of the risks for which capital requirements 
are calculated and imposed ; and imposition of a leverage 
ratio (the ratio of capital to total assets), a measure that 
depends upon total assets rather than risk-weighted assets 
and thereby does not suffer from model risk associated 
with estimating capital based on a VaR approach.
Another necessary condition for the best-practice regula-
tory approach to succeed is that there must be no risk of 
regulatory “capture”. Regulators must remain sufficiently 
sceptical to permit them to successfully challenge bank 
models, practices, and processes that could have a poten-
tial impact on risk. For instance, a number of bank prac-
tices prior to the crisis, such as the booking of assets with 
significant credit risk in the trading book rather than the 
banking book or the creation of off-balance-sheet vehicles 
like SIVs, were undertaken for the purpose of reducing 
regulatory capital requirements. One of the aims of the 
regulatory proposal of a minimum leverage ratio is in fact 
to limit the impact of this type of “regulatory arbitrage”. 
1.3  Assumptions 
One of the key assumptions underlying regulation in the 
pre-crisis period was that markets are “sufficiently” effi-
cient, in that market prices provide accurate indicators of 
economic value and risk, that financial innovation unam-
biguously  improves  efficiency,  especially  when  subject 
to competition, and that market discipline is a valuable 
complement to – and sometimes more effective than – 
supervision. This view was also reflected in the move to 
adopt fair value accounting principles, despite the reser-
vations expressed by some central banks and supervisory 
authorities. 
The crisis has prompted a critical re-examination of the 
efficient markets assumption. Authorities are now focus-
ing more attention on the possibility of market failures, 
including  development  of  irrational  price  “bubbles”, 
negative  externalities  created  by  “herd”  behaviour  of 
market participants, and the existence of moral hazard or 
asymmetric information problems which result in weak-
ened  or  ineffective  market  discipline.  Such  deviations 
from  efficient  markets  can  result  in  an  overabundance 
of market liquidity or an excessive amount of leverage 
in certain periods, followed by sudden liquidity dry-ups 
or destabilising de-leveraging in other periods. Proposed 
regulatory reforms that should help to reduce the occur-
rence or impact of such variations are the imposition of 
minimum liquidity requirements and a minimum leverage 
ratio. More generally, the re-examination of the efficient 
markets assumption appears to have persuaded a number 
of observers that more reliance on regulation is warranted 
in the future (e.g., see Greenspan, 2010).  
The  role  of  financial  innovation  has  also  come  under 
greater  scrutiny.  Many  types  of  financial  innovations 
have  the  effect  of  permitting  an  increase  in  leverage. 
Innovations  can  also  create  common  exposures  among 
institutions.  For  example,  the  tranching  of  securities 
backed by a pool of assets and the sale of the tranches 
to different institutions automatically create a common 
exposure of those institutions to the underlying pool of 
assets. The capacity of financial innovation to heighten 
common  exposures  among  institutions  was  aptly  dem-
onstrated in the crisis by the securities backed by U.S. 
subprime mortgages.  At the same time, the robustness 
of innovations in the event of a shock is, by definition, 
initially  untested,  and  the  ultimate  distribution  of  risk 
achieved by the innovation may be quite opaque and dif-
ficult to predict. As a result, financial innovation can have 
a significant, sometimes unexpected, impact on financial 
stability. One of the regulatory responses to financial inno-
vation  relating  to  securitisation  products  that  preceded 
the crisis has been to sharply raise capital requirements  (1)  The time horizon over which losses are calculated depends on the type of asset.118
for resecuritisations, which are complex securities whose 
payments  are  themselves  backed  by  tranches  of  other 
securitisations. In addition, a fundamental review of the 
calculation of regulatory capital requirements for securiti-
sations is currently ongoing.
2.  Reforms of the Basel II framework
As mentioned above, authorities have adopted a broad 
approach in identifying the causes of the crisis and pro-
posing measures to redress the associated weaknesses 
and  failures.  Chart  1  provides  an  illustration  of  the 
array of reforms that are being contemplated or pro-
posed. The proposals encompass efforts to strengthen 
financial  institutions’  capital  and  liquidity  buffers,  to 
improve the incentives of financial institution manag-
ers with respect to governance and risk taking, and to 
adapt legal and organizational structures of financial 
institutions and markets to increase transparency and 
reduce the level of risk and to permit effective resolu-
tion of distress.
This section focuses on proposals devoted to strength-
ening financial institutions’ capital and liquidity buffers. 
Several  proposals  for  reforms  to  the  Basel  II  frame-
work have been formulated in a series of consultative 
documents issued by the Basel Committee in 2009 (see 
Basel Committee 2009a, 2009b, and 2009c). Some of 
these proposals are at an advanced stage, while others 
are more preliminary. Chart 2 illustrates the proposed 
reforms. 
Section  2.1  discusses  the  reforms  intended  primarily  to 
mitigate systemic risk. Falling in this category are policies 
relating  to  systemically  important  banks,  loan-loss  provi-
sions based on expected loss, and countercyclical capital 
buffers. Section 2.2 reviews reforms designed to increase 
or improve the quality of capital, including rules relating to 
counterparty credit risk, exposures to large financial institu-
tions, leverage, and securitisation. These reforms could be 
argued to aim primarily at strengthening the resiliency of 
individual  institutions,  although  in  some  cases  they  also 
help to mitigate systemic risk. Finally, Section 2.3 describes 
proposed  liquidity  requirements,  which  represent  a  new 
addition to the framework. Table 1 at the end of section 2 
presents a summary of the different reform proposals. 
2.1  Macroprudential concerns and systemic risk. 
The discussion of systemic risk in Section 1 points to two 
important  dimensions :  the  cross-sectional  dimension, 
focusing on a given point in time and taking into account, 
for example, externalities that would be imposed by the 
failure  of  a  systemically  important  institution ;  and  the 
time  dimension,  which  relates  to  the  variation  of  sys-
temic risk over time and the procyclicality of the financial 
system. Proposed policies for systemically important insti-
tutions address the cross-sectional dimension of systemic 
risk, while proposals for forward-looking provisions and 
countercyclical capital buffers address the time dimension. 
Policies for systemically important banks. The failure of 
a systemically important bank (SIB) can cause failures of 
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many other banks and widespread distress in the financial 
system.  Hence,  the  failure  of  a  systemically  important 
bank  generates  costs  that  are  not  internalized  by  the 
bank. In light of this, the Basel Committee is currently 
considering the merits of applying special policies to sys-
temically  important  banks.  These  policies  could  include 
a  capital  or  liquidity  surcharge  or  some  other  type  of 
supervisory tool such as enhanced supervision. One of the 
objectives of imposing special policies would be to ensure 
that  systemically  important  banks  internalize  at  least  a 
part of the costs their failure would impose on others. 
Policies applied to SIBs would also be intended to reduce 
the probability or impact of their failure. 
One of the challenges arising with respect to the applica-
tion of policies to systemically important banks is how to 
determine the degree of systemic importance. Although 
several methods for measuring systemic importance have 
recently been proposed, there is no consensus on the best 
method.  (1) Data limitations also pose major difficulties. 
Three important determinants of the systemic importance 
of an institution are its size, its interconnectedness with 
other institutions in the system, and the degree of sub-
stitutability of its activities.  (2) Of these three factors, inter-
connectedness is arguably the most difficult to measure. 
For example, authorities currently do not have good knowl-
edge of the network of exposures (especially cross-border) 
between financial institutions and, therefore, of the struc-
ture  of  the  network  or  of  the  systemic  importance  of 
particular institutions.  (3) This lack of knowledge applies as 
much to traditional interbank credit exposures as to more 
nontraditional exposures such as derivatives. Furthermore, 
the inability to accurately measure the network of direct 
exposures between institutions means that indirect expo-
sures, and therefore the potential “second-round” effects 
of a shock, remain completely unknown.  (4) Authorities will 
need to cooperate in the future to identify significant expo-
sures of all types among large financial institutions. 
Forward-looking  provisions.  Loan  loss  provisions  are 
designed  to  help  banks  cover  expected  losses  due  to 
defaulting  loans,  whereas  capital  is  intended  to  cover 
“unexpected”  losses.  (5)  As  a  means  of  reducing  the 



























(1)  See Castro and Ferrari (this FSR) for a discussion of proposed measures of syste-
mic important that make use of market data.
(2)  See IMF/BIS/FSB (2009).
(3)  The overall structure of the system can strongly influence its resistance to failure 
of an individual institution.  See, e.g., Allen and Gale (2000) and Degryse and 
Nguyen (2007).
(4)  The transfer of certain types of trades to central counterparties could be potenti-
ally helpful in this regard.
(5)  Unexpected loss is defined as the difference between the VaR; i.e. the value of 
losses at some percentile (e.g., 99.9) of the loss distribution, and expected loss, 
which is the mean value of the loss distribution.120
procyclicality inherent in the financial system, the Basel 
Committee is making a number of efforts to induce banks 
to undertake forward-looking provisioning. First, the Basel 
Committee is encouraging the International Accounting 
Standards  Board  to  move  to  an  approach  of  allowing 
banks to provision on the basis of expected losses, rather 
than  the  current  practice  of  incurred  loss  provisioning. 
In addition, the Basel Committee is revising its supervi-
sory guidance on sound provisioning practices to ensure 
consistency with the desired expected loss approach. The 
Committee is also reviewing the treatment of provisions 
in the Basel II framework, with the aim of removing any 
disincentives for banks to engage in sound provisioning. 
For example, shortfalls in stocks of provisions should now 
be deducted entirely from the common equity compo-
nent of Tier-1 capital. Since provisions have traditionally 
been deducted from retained earnings, hence common 
equity,  requiring  that  shortfalls  also  be  deducted  from 
common equity should eliminate an incentive for banks 
to under-provision.
Countercyclical  capital  buffers.  Concern  has  been 
expressed  over  the  years  about  the  cyclical  nature  of 
behaviour  of  banks  and  other  financial  market  par-
ticipants,  the  potential  for  risk-based  regulatory  capital 
requirements to heighten procyclicality and the possible 
negative  consequences  for  the  real  economy.  As  was 
noted in the previous section, these factors cause the level 
of risk in the financial system to vary over time. Although 
several measures were previously introduced in the Basel II 
Framework to mitigate cyclicality in capital requirements, 
the  Basel  Committee is  now  considering the  possibility 
of  requiring  countercyclical  capital  buffers,  as  one  way 
of  better  protecting  banks  from  cyclical  swings  in  risk, 
with the additional aim of weakening the transmission 
of shocks from the financial sector to the real economy.
Although  the  proposals  are  still  at  a  very  early  stage, 
one potential way of determining countercyclical capital 
buffers would be as follows. A macroeconomic variable 
or group of variables would be used in each country to 
identify boom periods or periods of high credit growth. 
As a function of the realisations of the macro-economic 
variables, authorities in each country would decide upon 
the necessary level of the buffer above the minimum capi-
tal requirement in that country. The level of the required 
buffer  would  rise  as  the  boom  progresses,  reaching 
some maximum requirement if the boom lasts for a long 
enough period.
The buffer required for a given financial institution would 
depend  on  the  geographical  distribution  of  its  credit 
exposures. For financial institutions with credit exposures 
in multiple countries, the buffer would be calculated as 
the weighted average of the announced buffers in each 
of the countries in which the bank has exposures, where 
the weight for each country would be the percentage of 
the bank’s total credit exposures accounted for by coun-
terparts in that country.
One of the main challenges of implementing the proposal 
for  countercyclical  capital  buffers  would  be  to  identify 
variables in each country that constitute reliable indicators 
of periods of excessive credit growth and of downturns, 
so that the build-up and release of the capital buffer in a 
given country truly coincides with movements of the cycle 
in that country. Because of this difficulty, the determina-
tion of the buffer in any given country would likely not 
be strictly rule-based but, rather, would be subject to the 
exercise of authorities’ judgement. 
2.2  Increasing and improving minimum capital 
Counterparty  credit  risk.  Increases  in  capital  for  coun-
terparty  credit  risk  and  for  exposures  to  large  financial 
institutions  represent  reforms  aimed  at  mitigating  con-
tagion  due  to  interconnectedness.  The  strengthened 
requirements for counterparty credit risk help to reduce 
contagion arising from derivatives exposures, repos, and 
securities financing activities. These requirements are also 
intended  to  encourage  greater  use  of  central  counter-
parties  and  exchanges  for  derivatives  transactions.  The 
reforms require banks to use stressed inputs (i.e., values 
of inputs during periods of stress) in the calculation of 
their capital charges for counterparty credit risk. The Basel 
Committee notes that this practice is similar to practices 
recently introduced in the framework for calculation of 
capital requirements for market risk of traded assets. The 
similarity  should  help  to  promote  integrated  manage-
ment of market and counterparty risks. Standards for risk 
management  for  counterparty  relationships,  including 
collateral management and the treatment of wrong-way 
risk, are also being strengthened.  (1)  
Exposures to large financial institutions. Recent work by 
the Basel Committee suggests that large financial institu-
tions are actually more interconnected than the Basel II 
capital charges would have implied. As a consequence, a 
proposal has been made to increase the assumed values 
of asset value correlations for large financial institutions in 
the formula for calculating capital charges for exposures 
to these institutions. This will result in an increase in mini-
mum capital requirements for such exposures. The cur-
rent proposal is to apply the higher correlation values to 
(1)  Wrong-way risk occurs when an exposure to a counterparty is adversely correla-
ted with the credit risk of the counterparty.121
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regulated financial institutions (banks, broker dealers, and 
insurance companies) whose assets exceed 25 billion USD 
and to all unregulated financial institutions, regardless of 
size. Financial institutions are broadly defined to include 
highly leveraged firms such as hedge funds and financial 
guarantors.  
Improving the quality of capital. The crisis revealed that 
a number of instruments that had been included in the 
regulatory  definition  of  capital  had  insufficient  capac-
ity to absorb losses as long as the institution remains a 
going concern. Consequently, the key principle underly-
ing the measures to improve the quality of capital is that 
common  equity  will  become  the  predominant  form  of 
Tier 1 capital. Criteria for inclusion of instruments other 
than common equity in Tier 1 capital will be tightened. 
In addition, lack of consistency in the definition of capital 
across countries has motivated the Basel Committee to 
attempt to harmonize the allowed deductions and pru-
dential filters. Varying levels of disclosure across countries 
regarding the level and nature of capital have also led the 
Basel  Committee  to  propose  measures  to  improve  the 
transparency of Tier 1 capital. 
Leverage  ratio.  A  minimum  leverage  ratio  (capital/total 
assets) is being proposed as a complement to risk-based 
capital requirements, in order to mitigate the impact of 
model risk in the calculation of the latter and to reduce 
the  probability  of  a  build-up  of  excessive  leverage  on 
banks’  balance  sheets,  which  could  trigger  negative 
asset price – deleveraging spirals following a shock. It is 
proposed that the capital included in the numerator of 
the leverage ratio be the high-quality definition of capital 
corresponding to the new Tier 1 definition. The measure 
of total exposures (assets) in the denominator will include 
off-balance  sheet  as  well  as  on-balance  sheet  items. 
Exposure  measures  should  preferably  be  accounting 
measures, adapted to ensure consistency across countries 
with different accounting standards.  
Securitization. The issuance of complex financial products, 
such as ABS CDOs  (1) and other resecuritizations, and the 
booking of these instruments in the trading book played 
a  crucial  role  in  the  crisis  and  accounted  for  a  signifi-
cant percentage of banks’ losses.  (2) Recognizing that the 
capital requirements for trading book exposures did not 
adequately cover the risks of these complex instruments, 
the  Basel  Committee  has  issued  revisions  of  the  capital 
requirements for such assets (BCBS 2009d), sharply rais-
ing  the  required  capital  for  resecuritizations  held  in  the 
banking book or the trading book. Resecuritizations will 
also no longer be eligible for use as financial collateral. 
In addition, in order to reduce banks’ reliance on external 
ratings, banks are required to conduct their own analyses 
of externally rated securitization exposures, as a supple-
ment to the capital requirements based on the ratings. A 
number of additional measures to reduce reliance on exter-
nal ratings and to eliminate negative incentives created by 
ratings “cliffs” in the Basel II framework have also been   
proposed.(3) Finally, the Basel Committee is undertaking a 
fundamental review of the securitization framework, which 
will likely result in a re-calibration of capital requirements for 
securitizations and a less prominent role for external ratings. 
Capital  linked  to  exposures  in  the  trading  book.  The 
amendments to capital requirements for exposures in the 
trading book represent a response to the observation that 
the existing capital framework did not cover some of the 
key risks in the trading book. An incremental risk capital 
charge has now been added, in order to cover default and 
migration risk of the securities held in the trading book. 
The Basel Committee is also now requiring the use of a 
stressed value at risk for determining capital charges for 
market risk. The Committee also makes clear that regula-
tors have the ability to require institutions to adjust asset 
valuations in cases where there is uncertainty in realizable 
values of assets due to illiquidity. Finally, banks must justify 
their actions relative to factors that are taken into account 
in  pricing  models  but  then  excluded  in  calculations  of 
value at risk. 
2.3  Liquidity requirements
The Basel Committee (2009a) has proposed two quan-
titative  ratios  for  the  determination  of  banks’  liquidity 
requirements.  The  first,  the  liquidity  coverage  ratio,  is 
intended to ensure that banks have sufficient high quality, 
unencumbered liquid assets to survive an acute, 30-day 
stress scenario specified by supervisors. The requirement 
is that the stock of high-quality liquid assets must exceed 
the estimated net cash outflows of the 30-day period. The 
scenario proposed by the Basel Committee for determin-
ing the liquidity coverage ratio contains several features 
resembling the liquidity shocks that occurred during the 
crisis.  These  include  a  combined  system-wide  and  idi-
osyncratic shock, loss of wholesale funding capacity, loss 
of ability to obtain short-term secured funding for all but 
high-quality  liquid  assets,  etc.  Which  assets  qualify  as 
high-quality liquid assets will be determined after analysis 
of the results from an ongoing quantitative impact study.
(1)  ABS CDOs are collateralised debt obligations (tranched securities) backed by 
a pool of tranches from other asset-backed securities transactions, primarily 
mortgage-backed securities. 
(2)  According to the Basel II framework, the trading book should consist of positions 
in financial instruments and commodities held either with trading intent or in 
order to hedge other elements of the trading book. To be veligible for trading 
book capital treatment, financial instruments must either be free of any restrictive 
covenants on their tradability or able to be hedged completely. 
(3)  Ratings cliffs arise when a small change in rating results in a substantial increase 
in capital requirements.122
The second liquidity ratio is the net stable funding ratio, 
which is intended to increase the longer-term resilience 
of banks to shocks by fostering more stable sources of 
funding. This requirement sets a minimum level of stable 
funding  based  upon  the  liquidity  characteristics  of  the 
institution’s  assets  over  a  one-year  horizon.  The  rule  is 
that the available amount of stable funding must be at 
least as great as the “required” amount of stable fund-
ing,  which  is  determined  on  the  basis  of  supervisory 
assumptions regarding the liquidity characteristics of on 
and off-balance sheet exposures, including securitisation 
pipelines  and  investment  banking  inventories.  Available 
stable funding is defined as the sum of the institution’s 
capital, preferred stock with maturity no less than one 
year, liabilities with maturities of no less than one year, 
and the portion of “stable” non-maturity deposits which 
would be expected to remain with the institution during 
a prolonged stress event.
3.  Crisis resolution frameworks
In  addition  to  revealing  cracks  in  the  crisis  prevention 
framework,  the  crisis  has  highlighted  significant  weak-
nesses  in  crisis  management  arrangements  in  many 
countries. These weaknesses were particularly apparent 
in the case of cross-border financial institutions, yet even 
for domestic banks the crisis resolution framework often 
proved  inadequate.  Given  that  national  crisis  manage-
ment frameworks were not designed to accommodate the 
resolution of cross-border institutions, the crisis gave rise 
to a series of ad-hoc, uncoordinated measures, in many 






Policies for systemically  
important banks
Development of approaches for measuring systemic importance of institutions. Consideration of  
policy options for reducing probability and impact of failure of systemically important banks.
   
Forward-looking provisions Revision of supervisory guidance to ensure consistency with an expected loss approach to  
provisioning. Shortfalls in stocks of provisions should now be deducted entirely from the common  
equity component of Tier-1 capital, since additions to provisions are deducted from retained  
earnings, hence common equity.
   
Countercyclical capital buffers Impose a build-up of capital buffers above the minimum in good times, and allow a draw-down of  
the buffer in bad times. Macroeconomic or system-wide variables would be used by supervisors  
as indicators of good times and bad times.
   
Counterparty credit risk (CCR) Increase capital for counterparty credit risk linked to OTC derivatives, repos and other securities  
financing transactions. Use of stressed inputs in formula for calculation of minimum capital  
requirement CCR . Capital charge for mark-to-market losses due to falling creditworthiness of  
a counterparty.
   
Exposures to large financial  
institutions
Increase capital for exposures to large financial institutions by increasing correlation parameter  
in formula used for calculation of minimum capital requirement.
   
Improve quality of capital Increase the loss-absorption capacity of Tier-1 capital. Common equity the predominant form.  
Harmonization of deductions and prudential filters.
   
Leverage ratio Impose a minimum requirement of capital to total assets, including off-balance sheet items. Based  
on accounting measures, adjusted to account for cross-country differences in accounting rules.
   
Securitizations Increase capital requirements for complex securitization exposures. Review of capital requirements  
for securitization and reliance on ratings.
   
Trading book Use of stressed value-at-risk for determining capital requirement for market risk. Banks must justify  
any exclusion of factors from value-at-risk calculations that were included in pricing models.  
Regulators may require banks to adjust valuations for illiquidity. 
   
Liquidity requirements Impose two liquidity requirements : a 30-day coverage ratio, to address short-term disruptions ;  
and a stable funding ratio.
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cases resulting in the ring-fencing of activities, questions 
about distortion of competition, or higher costs of reso-
lution than would have occurred with more cooperative 
solutions. Much effort is currently being undertaken to try 
to bolster the cross-border crisis management framework. 
As noted by the European Commission, Europe needs a 
strong regulatory framework that covers prevention, early 
intervention, bank resolution and winding up.  (1)
With  respect  to  both  national  and  cross-border  crises, 
authorities need an adequate toolkit for intervening early 
in a distressed institution and for achieving an efficient 
resolution  of  the  problem.  One  of  the  most  effective 
measures would be the passage of special banking resolu-
tion or insolvency laws that would provide specific powers 
to authorities, including : 
–    the power to take control of distressed financial insti-
tutions,  implying  the  ability  to  give  instructions  to 
the institution’s management and bypass its board of 
directors ;
–    the  power  to  transfer  some  activities  of  a  financial 
group to another entity, which could be a private sector 
purchaser, a “bad bank”, or a government-run bridge 
bank ; 
–    the power to transfer all or part of the shares of an 
ailing financial institution to a private sector purchaser 
or temporarily to the government ;
–    the  power  to  require  certain  stakeholders,  such  as 
subordinated debtors, to bear some of the costs of any 
rescue operation ;
–    the power to influence the future business strategy of 
the institution and its risk appetite.
Many countries do not have specific legal provisions for 
bank  insolvency ;  insolvent  banks  are  treated  identically 
to  nonfinancial  firms  under  company  insolvency  law. 
This identical treatment ignores critical differences in the 
timing and impact of the insolvency of banks relative to 
nonfinancial firms, and it ties the hands of financial regu-
lators in intervening in a distressed bank to prevent its 
insolvency or to soften its impact on the financial system 
and the economy.
At the same time, any special bank insolvency law must 
strike a balance between shareholders’ and stakeholders’ 
rights on the one hand and the common interest on the 
other. In particular, strict limits and safeguards must be 
set for authorities’ recourse to the exceptional powers. 
Determination of the trigger for authorities’ intervention 
is also critical. The overall objectives of such legislation 
must be to maintain and enhance public and market con-
fidence in the stability of the financial system, to foster 
private sector solutions and minimise the use of public 
funds, and to limit moral hazard arising with respect to 
systemically important financial institutions and the belief 
by market participants that these institutions will be res-
cued if they encounter distress.
In addition to the provision of special powers to authori-
ties  via  special  bank  insolvency  laws,  efforts  are  under 
way to have large cross-border financial institutions devise 
recovery and resolution plans. These plans are sometimes 
referred  to  as  “living  wills”.  The  recovery  plan  focuses 
on how the bank could can resolve distress, identifying 
for instance, strategies to reinforce the capital or liquid-
ity position of the bank. It may also, however, go much 
further,  specifying  how  certain  business  lines  could  be 
discontinued or units sold. 
The objective of the resolution plan is to aid authorities 
in  winding  up  the  institution  if  the  recovery  plan  fails. 
The plan should facilitate the intervention of  authorities 
in closing the institution and /or in transferring activities 
or deposits to other institutions. This plan should define, 
among other things, potential resolution proposals, how 
the  bank  will  provide  necessary  data  to  authorities  so 
that  they  can  evaluate  the  resolution  options,  and  the 
potential obstacles that could arise in implementing the 
resolution strategy.  (2) 
As  a  consequence  of  the  living  will,  authorities  may 
require the institution to simplify the legal structure of the 
group, to introduce firewalls between different business 
lines, or to reduce the interconnectedness between the 
different entities of the group. The living will is drafted by 
the institution itself but is subject to a review by authori-
ties. It should be regularly updated, to take account of 
changes in the group’s structure, activities, and risks.
Finally, another crucial issue that must be addressed with 
respect to the resolution of cross-border crises is that of 
burden sharing. The debate on burden-sharing has been 
passionate  at  times,  and  there  are  many  reasons  for 
the sensitivity of the topic. In the first instance, ex ante 
burden sharing agreements – i.e., agreements that specify 
a sharing rule ex ante, before a crisis has occurred – are 
currently infeasible  (3). Nevertheless, the crisis has demon-
strated that ex-post burden sharing agreements are pos-
sible. In this context, Praet and Nguyen (2010) propose a 
stepwise approach to further advance the burden-sharing 
debate.  These  steps  include :  (i)  defining  and  agreeing 
on  the  objective  of  burden-sharing ;  (ii)  determining 
which aspects of the agreement can be set ex ante and 
which are necessarily left to an ex-post decision, and (iii) 
(1)  See European Commission (2009).
(2)  For further detail see the box in Nguyen (this FSR).
(3)  See Nguyen (2008) for a discussion of ex ante versus ex post burden sharing 
rules.124
devising  ways  to  facilitate  decision-making,  including 
enhancing information flows, increasing speed of pro-
cedures and fostering trust between authorities. Along 
these  lines,  cooperation  in  cross-country  negotiations 
could be fostered by the presence of an authority not 
directly involved in the crisis, who could participate for 
the purpose of representing the common interest. This 
third party could have a passive role as observer, or if 
the  interested  parties  agree  and  if  need  be,  could  be 
assigned  a  more  active  role  as  a  facilitator  or  media-
tor. One might even contemplate specifically creating a 
European Resolution Authority.  (1)
Conclusion
This article has examined the impact of the recent crisis 
on the views and focus of financial regulators, and it has 
discussed  some  proposed  financial  sector  reforms.  The 
reforms being contemplated and discussed by authorities 
cover all of the areas of supervision, regulation and crisis 
management, reflecting the need for a holistic response 
to  the  crisis.  This  article  has  concentrated  on  reforms 
linked to banking regulation and to the crisis manage-
ment framework.
One of the outcomes of the ongoing reflection is that 
authorities are now more focused on systemic risk and 
on potential market failures than in the past. This has 
led  to  a  new  emphasis  on  macro-prudential  supervi-
sion, which will likely require a number of institutional 
changes (some of which are currently under discussion) 
designed to foster closer co-operation between micro-
prudential and macro-prudential supervisors. For exam-
ple, while the risks arising from the collective behaviour 
of  institutions  can  only  be  measured  at  macro  level, 
detailed information needed for making this assessment 
and relating to the behaviour of individual institutions 
must  be  communicated  by  micro-prudential  authori-
ties.  Similarly,  although  systemic  risks  can  be  partially 
addressed  at  the  micro-prudential  level,  e.g.,  through 
requirements aimed at reducing interconnectedness or 
special policies applied to systemically important finan-
cial  institutions,  micro-prudential  authorities  can  only 
make an imperfect assessment of systemic risk without 
measures designed specifically from a macro-prudential   
vantage point. Identification of the appropriate macro-
prudential instruments and determination of the neces-
sary degree and nature of interaction between macro-
prudential  and  micro-prudential  supervisors  will  be 
among the regulatory challenges going forward.
This article has discussed proposed reforms of the Basel II 
framework  aimed  at  reducing  systemic  risk,  as  well  as 
proposed changes to the framework designed to increase 
the breadth of risks for which banks must hold capital and 
to increase the quality of the capital and liquidity buffers 
that banks hold. In addition to these proposed changes to 
the Basel II framework, the Basel Committee has recently 
issued new, qualitative principles for enhancing corporate 
governance and an assessment methodology for supervi-
sors in promoting sound compensation practices, in line 
with  the  principles  for  sound  compensation  practices 
issued  by  the  Financial  Stability  Board  in  2009.  These 
documents not only define best practices in the critical 
areas of governance and compensation but also set out 
supervisory approaches for assessing banks’ compliance 
with these practices.  
Finally,  while  many  reform  proposals  have  been  put 
forth to date, the details and the ultimate reform pack-
age  have  not  yet  been  decided.  Essential  quantitative 
and qualitative analyses of the potential impacts of the 
proposed reforms, both individually and collectively, are 
ongoing. The goal will be to achieve a level of true reform 
in the financial sector that the crisis has revealed to be 
essential, while avoiding harmful effects and unintended 
consequences that could ultimately undermine the new 
measures.
(1)  See Praet and Nguyen (2010) for a proposal regarding a European Resolution 
Authority.125
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